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THE COURT’S POWER TO GRANT PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS IN CASES WHERE
ARBITRATION IS PENDING
By
Dwight A. Decker, Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION
In Janvey v. Alguire, the Fifth Circuit was forced to confront the circuit

split regarding a court’s ability to exercise its equitable powers in granting
injunctive relief while an order to compel arbitration is pending.1 Janvey is the
latest case in the saga of Courts trying to reconcile the Federal Arbitration Act’s
policy favoring arbitration with the Court’s traditional equitable role.2 Preliminary
injunctive relief is used to prevent injury while a case is pending; however, this
remedy is problematic when it involves the interaction of the public court system
and a private agreement to arbitrate.3 Courts considering a motion for preliminary
injunction while arbitration is pending face a dilemma accompanied by unclear
jurisprudence.
Even without the added question of arbitration, proving the requisite
elements necessary to receive a preliminary injunction can be a daunting task. A
plaintiff must establish four elements:
(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a
substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not
issued, (3) that the threatened injury if the injunction is
denied outweighs any harm that will result if the injunction
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is granted, and (4) that the grant of an injunction will not
disserve the public interest.4

An individual need not show that he or she will win his or her case but in order to
satisfy the first element he or she must demonstrate a prima facie case.5
Traditionally, the second element of irreparable harm applies where monetary
damages are not adequate, but may also be used to prevent the dispensation of
corporate funds so as to prevent insolvency.6 The third and fourth elements require
the court to balance the interests of both parties and the public.7 Only after these
four elements are addressed may the court then evaluate the appropriateness of
injunctive relief in regard to arbitration.8
II.

THE FIRST CIRCUIT
In Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., a contract dispute arose between a

semiconductor supplier and a laser manufacturer.9 The district court granted a
preliminary injunction, enjoining Mostek from selling the bulk of its assets and
rendering itself judgment proof.10 The injunction Teradyne requested was granted
pending the outcome of arbitration.11 The First Circuit, following the precedents of
the Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits and declining to follow the Eighth
Circuit, held that preliminary injunctive relief is proper in order to preserve the
status quo even in the face of arbitration.12
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The First Circuit, like all courts faced with the question of whether to grant
injunctive relief in the face of pending arbitration, must reconcile its holding with
the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp.13 In Moses H. Cone, the Supreme Court espoused a
federal objective of favoring arbitration regardless of state law.14 The First Circuit
found, that unlike in Moses H. Cone, the process of arbitration was not affected in
Teradyne because a party sought to stay arbitration in Moses H. Cone, whereas
here, a party sought to preserve a remedy pending a ruling on whether arbitration
was to be compelled.15 By preserving the status quo in granting preliminary
injunctive relief where the appropriate elements are met, the court believed it was
preserving the meaningfulness of arbitration and was thus is in line with the
Congressional intent of the Federal Arbitration Act.16
III.

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Salvano, the Seventh

Circuit addressed a courts ability to grant injunctive relief in a case where
arbitration was pending.17 Salvano involved a dispute in which employees of
Merrill Lynch resigned in favor of employment with a new firm; Merrill Lynch
subsequently sought an injunction preventing the now ex-employees from
soliciting clients or disclosing client information.18 Merrill Lynch obtained the
injunction sought, which Salvano attempted to have dismissed a number of times
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during the course of arbitration.19 Merrill Lynch proved the requisite elements to
obtain an injunction and the Seventh Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit’s
contention that granting a preliminary injunction preserves the meaningfulness of
arbitration.20 This preliminary injunction, like the others discussed infra, was
applicable only for the period leading up to the point where arbitration was
compelled.21
IV.

THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
In another case involving Merrill Lynch, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &

Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, the Eighth Circuit addressed nearly identical issue as the
Seventh Circuit in Salvano.22 The Court in Hovey first addressed the issue of
arbitrability before addressing the appropriateness of injunctive relief.23 As a
member of the New York Stock Exchange, Merrill Lynch was required to submit
its dispute with Hovey to arbitration as per rule 347 of the New York Stock
Exchange.24 The Eighth Circuit focused first on the question of arbitrability before
addressing the preliminary injunction, finding that arbitration agreements should
be construed liberally so that doubt regarding the scope of the arbitration
agreement should be construed in favor of arbitration.25 Unlike the Seventh Circuit
in Salvano, the Eighth Circuit held that where a dispute is arbitrable, the court must
look to the terms of the agreement in order to determine the appropriateness of
granting a preliminary injunction.26 The injunction was viewed as an undue delay
19
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or obstruction placed on arbitration by the courts and therefore runs contrary to the
purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act.27 The determinative issue for the Eight
Circuit was the actual agreement to arbitrate.28 Unlike RGI v. Tucker, discussed
below, the contract in Hovey was silent on the issue or preliminary injunctions.29
These two issues, the Federal Arbitration Acts liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration and the lack of agreement by the parties, led the Eighth Circuit to
conclude that preliminary injunctive relief under this situation is improper.30
It should be noted that the Eighth Circuit may uphold a preliminary
injunction in cases where the end result is to possibly shorten the time it takes to
compel arbitration.31
V.

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
The Fifth Circuit addressed the same issues presented in Hovey when it

decided RGI, Inc. v. Tucker & Assocs., Inc. but distinguished its ruling based on
the facts.32 In RGI the Navy contracted with Tucker & Assocs. to manage
personnel records and Tucker subcontracted part of its work out to RGI.33 After an
investigation, it was discovered that RGI was in violation of the Federal Fair Labor
Standards Act; Tucker & Assocs. withheld payment to RGI pending an audit an
RGI brought suit to compel arbitration.34 Unlike in Hovey, the parties in RGI laid
out specific terms regarding the availability of injunctive relief within their
contract.35 The contract provided in relevant part:
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In the event that a dispute is submitted for arbitration
pursuant to this paragraph, this Subcontract shall continue in
full force and effect until such decision is rendered . . . If the
Contractor has capability to honor such invoices it shall
make such payments as required and the Subcontractor
services shall continue until such time as a decision is
rendered under this article.36

This distinction allowed the Fifth Circuit to address the same issues contemplated
by the Salvano and Hovey courts without taking a position or favoring a
jurisdiction.37 Allowing injunctive relief in RGI preserved the status quo as
contemplated by the parties, and did not contravene the purposes of the Federal
Arbitration Act because the Court simply enforced what was already agreed upon
by the parties.38
The Fifth Circuit re-addressed the issue of granting a preliminary
injunction while arbitration is pending in the recent case of Janvey v. Alguire. This
case arises out of a Securities and Exchanges Commission investigation that
uncovered an alleged multi-million dollar Ponzi scheme.39 The victims of this
alleged Ponzi scheme sought to freeze what assets were remaining in order to
preserve the availability of some measure of damages.40 In Janvey, the court faced
the issue of whether it could grant preliminary injunctive relief before deciding to
compel arbitration.41 Acknowledging the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,
the Fifth Circuit found that the Federal Arbitration Act provides little guidance
regarding preliminary injunctive relief prior to a decision on whether to compel

36
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arbitration.42 Although preserving the status quo usually has little effect on
arbitration, the question most courts face is: How much power does a private
agreement to arbitrate take away from the courts and place in the hands of the
arbitrator?
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the First Circuit in stating that a preliminary
injunction preserving the status quo maintains “the meaningfulness of the
arbitration process.”43 This holding, however, is quite limited in that it only applies
to the interim time before a court rules on a motion to compel arbitration; after the
court compels or denies arbitration, the parties were permitted to ask the courts to
reconsider the preliminary injunction. If arbitration were to be compelled, the
continuance of the injunction would be a matter for the arbitrator to decide.44
VI.

CONCLUSION
The circuit split between the Eighth and other circuits was brought to the

forefront by the latest Fifth Circuit opinion in Janvey.45 The split still exists
because while most circuits will grant a preliminary injunction in the time before
arbitration is compelled46 the Eighth Circuit still holds that granting a preliminary
injunction while arbitration is pending is an undue delay to the arbitration process
and impermissible under the Federal Arbitration Act.47 Although the vast majority
of circuits follow the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit, one must still be aware of the
contrary jurisprudence in the Eighth Circuit.48 It is important to remember that the
courts have not focused on creating a hard and fast rule where injunctive relief is
concerned; rather, all the courts have focused on the effect granting injunctive
42
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relief would have on the pending arbitration. This focus on the effect of granting
injunctive relief leaves room for a compelling argument to shift either
jurisprudence discussed infra by changing the way the effect of injunctive relief is
framed.

